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Introduction
A central question in international economics is how to measure the global business cycle. Kilian and Zhou (2018) compared several measures of global real economic activity used in modeling industrial commodity markets and showed that traditional proxies for global real GDP and global industrial production are less suited for modeling industrial commodity prices than the global real activity index constructed by Kilian (2009) from ocean bulk dry cargo freight rates. Hamilton (2018) recently questioned this conclusion. He observed that the Kilian (2009) index of global real economic activity depends on a normalization that has substantive consequences, of which users of the index must be aware. Specifically, Hamilton cautioned that this widely used index is sensitive to the base period chosen in constructing the nominal freight rate index. On this basis, he strongly argued against the use of the Kilian index in applied work.
This note clarifies that the problem documented by Hamilton is a consequence of a coding mistake in Kilian's analysis. Specifically, the index of nominal freight rates underlying the Kilian (2009) index was unintentionally logged twice, and this coding error was preserved in subsequent updates of the series. Once this coding error is corrected by removing one of the log transformations, none of the concerns raised by Hamilton remains valid and the description of the construction of the index matches exactly the discussion in Kilian (2009) . The corrected index is invariant to the normalization of the base period. For example, it is invariant to whether we normalize the nominal freight index to a value of 1 in January 1968, as in Kilian (2009 ) or in January 1973 , as in Hamilton (2018 . Not only does the corrected index look broadly similar, but it can also be shown that the empirical results in Kilian (2009) and related studies about the historical evolution of global oil demand and oil supply shocks, about the responses of the real price of oil to these shocks, about the determinants of the real price of oil, and about the effects of global oil demand and oil supply shocks on U.S. real GDP and inflation are extremely robust to correcting the index.
The remainder of this note elaborates on these points and examines more closely the claims made by Hamilton (2018) . Section 2 illustrates the robustness of the conclusions of Kilian (2009) and related studies. Section 3 addresses Hamilton's other concerns about the conceptual invalidity of the Kilian (2009) index. Section 4 discusses whether global industrial production is a suitable alternative to the Kilian index. Section 5 concludes.
How robust are earlier empirical results to the correction of the index?
It is straightforward to examine the robustness of the conclusions of Kilian (2009) The same conclusion was reached by Zhou (2018) who reexamined the conclusions of the extended global oil market model of Kilian and Murphy (2014) . The impulse responses and historical decompositions in that paper are equally unaffected by using the corrected index of global real economic activity. The same result also holds for the model in Kilian (2017) , which used a slightly different econometric methodology. Thus, one can say with confidence that the coding error highlighted by Hamilton (2018) is inconsequential.
Is the Kilian (2009) index of global real economic activity conceptually flawed?
In addition, Hamilton (2018) argues that the Kilian index is conceptually flawed, even after correcting the redundant log transformation. As this section shows, none of his arguments holds up to scrutiny. First, Hamilton (2018) presents a review of global bulk dry cargo shipping markets, which is intended to cast doubt on the use of indices derived from bulk dry cargo shipping rate data. His analysis, however, misrepresents the economic model discussed in Kilian (2009) and Kilian and Zhou (2018) . For example, increases in bulk dry cargo shipping capacity occur in response to shifts in the demand for bulk dry cargoes that drive up real shipping rates (see Stopford 1997; Greenwood and Hanson 2015) . They typically do not represent exogenous shifts in the static supply curve, as claimed by Hamilton, but are part of the dynamic propagation of shipping demand shocks. Hence, the assertion that declines in the Kilian index represent the causal effect of exogenous increases in shipping capacity and productivity is not correct. In fact, Kilian and Zhou (2018) explicitly refuted this hypothesis on empirical grounds. Second, Hamilton raises the concern that the linear trend estimate removed from the real shipping rates evolves over time, as more data become available. This is simply a generic feature of linear detrending. More data allow more precise estimates. Hamilton (2018) Third, Hamilton (2018, p. 2) suggests that changes in potential real GDP are reflected in linear trends in real bulk dry cargo shipping rates. In fact, there is no a priori reason to expect a systematic relationship between fluctuations in global real GDP and changes in the volume of bulk dry cargo ocean shipping, as discussed in Kilian and Zhou (2018) . The Kilian index was not designed to capture the cyclical component of global real GDP, but to help identify demand shifts in global commodity markets. Moreover, the global industrial production measure favored by Hamilton (2018) and discussed in the next section, does not in general reflect changes in global real GDP either (see Kilian and Zhou 2018) .
Is global industrial production a suitable alternative to the Kilian index?
Hamilton (2018) then proceeds to argue that the Kilian index is empirically implausible because it differs from his preferred measure of global industrial production. The problem with this argument is that global industrial production is a flawed measure of global real activity, as discussed in a recent comprehensive study of the merits of alternative measures of global real economic activity for modeling industrial commodity prices by Kilian and Zhou (2018) .
Specifically, the concern is that industrial raw materials are ordered in advance of an increase in industrial output. Thus, we need a leading indicator for industrial output rather than a coincident indicator when modeling real industrial commodity prices. Such a leading indicator is by construction driven by expected rather than actual industrial output, which makes both its timing and amplitude potentially different from global industrial production indices. Moreover, in evaluating the global business cycle, Hamilton superimposes U.S. recession dates on the measure of global real activity, ignoring that the United States is not the world (see, e.g., Kilian and Hicks 2013; Kilian and Zhou 2018) .
There is also the question of how to detrend global industrial production. Linear detrending may not be appropriate for real output series.
3 Month-to-month growth rates tend to downplay long cycles in the data. Finally, expressing global industrial production in 24-month cumulative growth rates, as suggested by Hamilton (2018) , generates implausible results. For example, it implies a higher business cycle peak in 2011 than in mid-2008. It also implies that the highest business cycle peak ever occurred in 1960, which is hard to reconcile with the stylized facts about commodity booms. Moreover, the resulting business cycle is not mean zero in the long run, which is not consistent with standard trend-cycle decompositions.
Conclusion
The problems with the Kilian (2009) index highlighted by Hamilton (2018) are the consequence of a simple coding mistake rather than some conceptual flaw in the index. Once this coding error is corrected, this index is a sensible measure of cyclical variation of the global economy, when modeling industrial commodity prices, with strong empirical and conceptual foundations. There is no good reason for relying on measures of global industrial production, as proposed by Hamilton (2018) . Indeed, the latter variable systematically mismeasures changes in global real activity relevant for industrial commodity markets and hence cannot be used to evaluate the merits of the Kilian index (see Kilian and Zhou 2018) . Nor is there a good case for expressing the data underlying the Kilian index in cumulative changes over two years, as proposed by
Hamilton. While this transformation may be used as a descriptive statistic, it does not replicate key features of the global business cycle documented in the literature. Original Index: Corrected Index:
NOTES: The plot shows point estimates and bootstrap confidence bands computed using the original code. 
